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1Abstract
Abstract1
This paper considers the implementation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The paper presents a 
portrait of the three neighbours in terms of their current political and 
socio-economic profiles, as well as the status of their relations with the 
European Union. Subsequently, it provides an overview of the development 
of ENP. A general set of conclusions are offered in relation to the key issue 
of good governance, where, the paper argues, ENP has delivered derisory 
results, with patchy effects across the region. Moreover, the paper identifies 
the democratic back-sliding in Ukraine and entenched authoritarianism in 
Belarus, which ENP has done very little to address. The EU’s willingness 
to provide better mobility options for ENP citizens to visit and work in 
the EU is a key test for the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in the coming year. 
This paper sees that whilst there are reasons to be cheerful here, with the 
EU’s recent offer of greater Visa Liberalisation for Ukraine and Moldova, 
there remains much to be done and in the meantime the EU remains a 
‘Fortress Europe’. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for 
ENP, which include the need to finally tackle corruption in the region, 
bring more differentiation into ENP, soften the EU’s borders through more 
generous Visa regimes, develop a more robust Belarus strategy and to 
think more creatively about the use of ENP funds for regional and cross-
border activities.
1 I would like to thank Dr Peter Van Elsuwege of Ghent University and Anna Zielinska 
of the Polish Institute for International Affairs for their insightful and valuable 
comments on a draft version of this paper. Thanks also go to Ivan Martin for his role 
as coordinator of this project.
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Résumé
Ce rapport examine la mise en oeuvre de la Politique Européenne de Voi-
sinage (PEV) en Ukraine, Moldavie et Biélorussie. Il dresse un portrait de 
ces trois pays voisins de l’Union Européenne au regard de leurs situations 
politiques et socio-économiques actuelles, ainsi que de leurs relations avec 
l’UE. Le rapport fournit par la suite une vision d’ensemble du dévelop-
pement de la PEV. Il aboutit à un ensemble de conclusions au sujet de la 
bonne gouvernance, domaine-clé dans lequel la PEV a atteint des résultats 
dérisoires et produit des effets inégaux à l’échelle de la région. De plus, le 
rapport constate que la PEV n’a pas permis d’avancée importante face au 
ralentissement de la démocratisation en Ukraine comme à l’autoritaris-
me profondément ancré en Biélorussie. La volonté de l’UE d’offrir aux ci-
toyens des pays de la PEV de meilleures possibilités de visiter l’UE et d’y 
travailler constituera un test important pour le Partenariat Oriental pour 
l’année à venir. Si le rapport reconnait que ce domaine offre des raisons de 
se réjouir, notamment suite à la récente offre de l’UE d’une plus grande li-
béralisation du régime des visas à l’égard de l’Ukraine et de la Moldavie, 
beaucoup reste à accomplir, l’UE conservant pendant ce temps ses allures 
de forteresse. Le rapport s’achève par un ensemble de recommandations 
pour la PEV, parmi lesquelles figure la nécessité de s’attaquer au problème 
de la corruption dans la région, d’aller vers une PEV plus différenciée, de 
rendre les frontières de l’UE moins imperméables par un assouplissement 
des régimes de visas, de développer une stratégie plus robuste à l’égard de 
la Biélorussie et d’être plus créatif dans l’emploi qui est fait des fonds de la 
PEV pour développer des activités régionales et transfrontalières.
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Rationale
‘….if the EU wants to become a credible global player, it should start from its 
neighbourhood. In the months and years to come, we must demonstrate our 
capacity to act convincingly in our neighbourhood, using all the instruments 
and opportunities for joined-up action offered by the Lisbon Treaty. This will be 
one of the main yardsticks with which our ability to implement the foreign policy 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty will be measured. This makes this Strategic Review 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy a very timely exercise.’ 2
This Natolin Research Paper provides an evaluation of the implementation of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the Eastern neighbourhood. 
The specific task in hand is to distil some of the main features of ENP 
as applied in Eastern Europe and assess the degree to which ENP has 
been successfully implemented vis à vis Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. 
Naturally, any study on policy implementation needs to have a forward-
looking perspective, thus this paper also considers ways in which the 
future implementation of ENP in the Eastern neighbourhood could be 
rendered more effective. 
The ENP Review
This paper was prompted by the ongoing review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy which is due to culminate in early summer with 
a Communication from the Commission.3 The outcome of this review 
is likely to re-shape and re-focus ENP into a more differentiated animal, 
possibly along the lines of the changes which have already transpired 
2 Speech by Stefan Fule ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Review’ 26 October 2010 to 
the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee. P.2.
3 For the background to the review refer to Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council: ‘Taking stock of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy’, Brussels, 12/05/2010 COM(2010) 207.
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over the last few years, which saw the creation of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008 and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009. 
One might also assume that a revitalised ENP will put a greater emphasis 
upon democracy promotion, as well as new measures to enhance the inter-
EU mobility of ENP citizens for work, study or tourism. Of course critical 
to the outcome of the review and its subsequent implementation will be 
the results of deliberations on the next EU financial perspective. 
What are the contours and objectives of the ENP review? A brief overview 
is useful here. The non-paper questionnaire presented by Catherine Ashton 
and Stefan Fühle in mid-2010 to the member states and ENP partners 
raised a number of issues to do with vision, medium term objectives and 
instruments. The authors asked about how future relations between the EU 
and the neighbouring states should look in 2020? Whether new contractual 
relations (Association Agreements) and Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreements, as the backbones to ENP bilateral relationships, should 
be pursued with all ENP states and how neighbours that remain fully 
outside or only quasi-inside ENP can be encouraged to join the fold. As 
already noted, new opportunities for labour mobility and exploring ways to 
improve upon the EU’s contribution to the settling of protracted conflicts 
figure in the paper, as does the theme of regional cooperation and how best 
to nurture this in the neighbourhood. To stimulate debate on optimising 
resources, the authors asked about which of the ENP instruments and tools 
work well and where the weaknesses lie and consequently, how policies 
and financial instruments can be better aligned and rendered more flexible 
to meet ENP objectives more squarely. In short, the parameters of the 
review encompass and seek to stimulate debate on virtually all aspects of 
ENP. 
The issue of ‘differentiation’ and ‘balance’ within ENP are increasingly at 
the heart of the matter. There are roughly three interrelated issues at stake 
here: (i) the balance between bilateral versus multilateral and regional 
channels of cooperation within ENP (ii) the question of balance between 
the Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods, principally in terms of funding 
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priorities and (iii) whether the ‘more for more’ principle, meaning awarding 
‘top performing’ states with a proven and sustained capacity to respond 
to EU stimuli with options for deeper and quicker cooperation with the 
EU, should be pursued in the ENP formula and better institutionalised. 
The notion here is basically that the EU should be prepared to up its offer 
more readily and with greater speed to those states that take ENP seriously. 
At the same time, the flip-side of this is to create better devices to punish 
and deny the benefits of cooperation with the EU for ill-performing states 
to better effect. 
If differentiation is indeed the name of the game, the basis of how to 
differentiate are contested. Radoslaw Sikorski and Carl Bildt, the two 
instigators of the Eastern Partnership seem to argue that greater differentiation 
within ENP should ‘allow for tailoring support modalities more closely to 
the increasingly differentiated needs of the Southern and Eastern partners…
.’.4 Meanwhile in a speech given by Fühle on 26 October to the European 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee the Commissioner argued that: 
‘….differentiation should be based on partner countries’ 
ambition in their relations with the EU, on their readiness 
to accept shared values, on which the EU is based, on their 
performance in governance and reform – rather than their 
geographical position’. 5 
The implications of all of this for the Eastern neighbours are evidently 
going to be high, but are as yet undetermined. Moreover, after the review 
process had already began, the revolutions and political unrest that swept 
across North Africa have had the effect of shifting the EU’s foreign policy 
radar to the South, which in many ways recalibrated the contours and 
objectives of the review. Indeed, the events in North Africa brought into 
focus the question as to whether ENP was having any effect at all in the 
4 Letter from Radoslaw Sikorski and Carl Bildt, Stockholm and Warsaw 6 October 2010.
5 Speech by Stefan Fule ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Review’, 26 October 2010 to 
the European Parliament Foreign affairs Committee.
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neighbourhood and whether brand new modalities of cooperation and 
funding should be conceived to meet new realities. 
A net-result of all of this is that the great leaps forwards in Eastern policy 
expected by the back-to-back Hungarian and Polish EU Presidencies might well 
be eclipsed by ongoing uncertainties in the South and a possible redistribution 
of ENP funding in favour of the southern neighbours.6 Whereas Hungary 
and Poland hoped to preside over a final agreement on a date for Croatia’s 
accession to the EU and to deal with the thorny question of Romania and 
Bulgaria’s entry into the borderless Schengen zone, these two major strategic 
priorities seem to of hit the buffer, for a variety of reasons, and importantly are 
not currently headline news. It is arguably the case that the unfinished job of 
democratisation in the Eastern neighbourhood can potentially be relegated into 
‘any other business’, thus running the risk of seeing Ukraine further backslide 
into authoritarianism and even give up on its European aspirations. There is 
also, of course, the case of Belarus where the entrenchment of the Lukashenko 
regime since the December 2010 election suggests that the EU’s method of 
stick and carrot doesn’t seem to be working. In light of this it will be interesting 
to see the extent to which the Commission Communication recognises the 
need to bolster the EU’s efforts vis à vis the East. In the meantime, one of the 
main tasks for the Poles who pick up the Presidency baton in july, will be to 
keep eyes focused on the Eastern Partnership and to come up with ‘tangible 
first results’,7 so as not to let the initiative fall short of its potential, as has been 
the case with the Union for the Mediterranean. 
6 See Franco Frattini’s comment in the Financial Times ‘A Pact for Euro-Mediterranean 
Stability’, February 17 2011 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/97c0cc46-3a9b-11e0-9c65-
00144feabdc0.html and the French non-paper of the same day http://www.diplomatie.
gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/11-02-17_Non papier_Action_de_l_Union_europeenne_en_
direction_du_voisinage_Sud.pdf. For further analysis on this subject see Kerry 
Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (2011) Keeping an Eye on the East: The Foreign 
Policy Priorities of the Central European Presidencies of the European Union, CEPA 
Issue Brief 118, 
 http://www.cepa.org/publications/view.aspx?record_id=172. 
7 See ‘Conclusions on Eastern Partnership’, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 
Luxembourg 25 October 2010. 
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Structure and Case Study
ENP is a multilayered policy framework within which relations between 
the neighbours to the East and the South and the EU member states are 
characterised by a heady mix of bilateral and multilateral endeavours spanning 
across an ever-growing range of policy areas. In this context and with the aim of 
avoiding an overly general analysis, this paper opts to focus on specific aspects 
and policy areas in ENP-East. The paper considers the area of political reform 
and principally the theme of good governance and corruption. It is the case 
that an inability to tackle corruption at all levels in all three countries presents 
one of the most serious challenges and obstacles to the broader reform process 
in Moldova and Ukraine, not to mention Belarus. This paper also develops a 
case study from within the Freedom, Security and justice (jLS) policy area. 
Mobility is taken as a core theme, meaning the movement of people from the 
outside in, and subsequently the paper focuses on EU (Schengen) visa policy 
(VP) and cognate issues vis à vis the ENP states. These subjects are pertinent 
in the context of ENP-East for a whole range of reasons.
First, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus are the EU’s closest neighbours, and 
since the recent enlargements of the European Union share extensive 
land borders with the EU. One of the main consequences of this physical 
proximity is that border management, migration and mobility issues are 
of immense importance and have become inextricably linked to the EU’s 
burgeoning security agenda and over time have gained central importance 
in the EU’s relations with ENP-East states. As was already noted in a 
Commission Communication of 2007 ‘Mobility is in itself a key foreign 
policy priority as this is the prism through which the citizens of partner 
countries perceive the EU.’8
Meanwhile, EU policy in this regard is seemingly motivated by a security 
rationale and the perceived need to secure member states against the spill-
8 Communication from the Commission ‘A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy’ 
Brussels, 05/12/2007 COM(2007) 774 final http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
com07_774_en.pdf. 
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over effects of illegal migration, trafficking and other such savoury activities 
emanating from the immediate neighbourhood and further afield. The 
European Security Strategy of 2003 articulated this priority and subsequently 
spoke about ‘building security in the EU’s neighbourhood’ and creating ‘a 
ring of well governed states’ around the enlarged EU.9 Furthermore, a key 
ENP strategy paper saw that: 
Obviously, mobility can only develop in a secure environment, 
and security improvements will help to create the conditions 
for greater mobility. The promotion of mobility will go hand in 
hand with the commitment of our partners to increase security 
and justice and fight illegal migration, with efforts to strengthen 
our neighbours’ capacity to deal with migratory flows to their 
countries, and with the security of documents.10
Consequently, the EU puts efforts into protecting the internal security 
and integrity of the Union at the same time as promoting security and 
stability on the other side of the border. This has entailed the erection of 
strong borders and buffer zones, to keep the neighbours at arms’ length, 
to prevent illegal and irregular migration and cross-border activities, but 
at the same time exporting the EU’s brand of integration eastwards via 
ENP, in part by creating opportunities for cooperation and mobility that 
might transcend those ‘hard’ borders. With this in mind, one can refer to 
the Prague declaration of May 2009, which saw the inauguration of the 
Eastern Partnership and where one of the key objectives concerned was 
defined as ‘supporting mobility of (ENP) citizens and visa liberalisation 
in a secure environment’ (authors emphasis added). 
It is in the context of the EaP that a sizeable emphasis on cross-border 
mobility, people to people contacts and further liberalisation of EU visa 
policy has been placed. Commentators have already argued that visible 
9 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, European Security Strategy. 2003. http://www.
iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf. 
10 ‘A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy’, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
com07_774_en.pdf. 
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progress in this area is the ‘litmus test’ for EaP, and that the new frameworks 
established might offer value-added to the neighbours in this regard.11 
Also important to note is that governments, Civil Society Organisations 
and citizens in ENP states have high expectations in this area and take the 
view that greater liberalisation and more generosity from the EU is long 
overdue. So, rather than just a litmus test, this paper sees that it might be 
the case that the very survival of EaP is contingent on progress in the area 
of mobility.
Interestingly, EU policy differs substantially in the Southern and Eastern 
neighbourhoods in this domain and as yet there are no visa facilitation 
agreements in place with any Southern ENP state. In contrast, commentators 
stress that the marriage of Visa facilitation agreements (VF)12 and Readmission 
Agreements (RA) has become a cornerstone in the EU’s relations with 
its Eastern neighbours and a standard tool in the advancement of ENP.13 
Certainly in the cases of Ukraine and Moldova, RAs and VF agreements 
have become a ‘package deal’ in the EU’s approach, where concessions in the 
area of visa policy (fee waivers, smoother application and response processes 
etc.) are given in return for the signing of a RA and rigorous adoption of EU 
standards in Border Management, including efforts at border demarcation 
and document security. 
11 Peter Van Elsuwege ‘The Eastern Partnership: Characteristics and Challenges’, 
Studia Universitatis Petru Maior. 
12 The main purpose of the agreement is to facilitate, on the basis of reciprocity, the 
issuance of short-stay visas (90 days per period of 180 days). Long-stay visas remain 
within the authority of the member states. A visa-free travel regime is recognised in 
all agreements as the long-term objective.
13 Delcour, Laure (2010) ‘The European Union: A Security Provider in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood?’ European Security, 19: 4, 535 — 549; Trauner, Florian and Krause, 
Imke (2008) ‘EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: A New Standard 
EU Foreign Policy Tool?’ Paper presented to the ECPR fourth pan-european 
conference on EU politics, Riga, September 25-27 2008, http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-
riga/virtualpaperroom/058.pdf; Boniface, jérôme, Wesseling, Mara, O’Connell, 
Kevin and Ripoll Servent, Ariadna ‘Visa Facilitation versus Tightening of Control: 
Key Aspects of the ENP, Study of the DG External Policies of the European Union, 
2008. http://www.eipa.eu/files/visa_facilitation.pdf 
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Of course there is a strong historical dimension to all of this, which 
remains relevant and should be mentioned here. After 1989 national 
borders in East and Central Europe became rather fluid and open. Border 
regions, for example between Poland and Ukraine, became hives of cross 
border activity, facilitated by visa-free regimes and porous boundaries. 
However, in the run up to EU enlargement dramatic changes arose. As 
part of their accession to the EU, states had to adopt Schengen rules and 
crucially to impose new visa regimes vis à vis their eastern neighbours – 
all of whom still remain on the Schengen Black List.14 The effects of this, 
commentators argued, were going to be considerable and in actual fact 
would not necessarily benefit the EU. The new Eastern neighbours would 
essentially be excluded from the integration process by the creation of 
‘non-negotiable’ borders around a fortified EU. The net result of these 
new borders/visa regimes, commentators argued at the time, would be 
quite the opposite to the goals intended; rather than enhanced stability 
and security, the Schengen wall would bring insecurity and instability.15 
Crucially, in its Eastern dimension, ENP was developed as a response to 
this situation, as a means to cushion the negative effects of enlargement 
and to provide some form of compensation for the imposition of hard 
borders/visa regimes. 
The next part of this paper highlights the problems and issues involved 
in researching ENP and particularly the question of implementation. The 
paper considers these methodological issues in a fairly lengthy fashion 
given their importance to an academic study of this kind. Next comes the 
question ‘who are the neighbours’?, which is tackled with a brief survey of 
basic social and economic data, foreign policy trends and cognate issues 
seen over a period of time. The main finding here is that the Eastern 
neighbourhood is still detached from the EU mainstream, but at the 
14 Meanwhile Ukraine and Moldova got rid of their visa requirements for EU citizens. 
15 See for example, Apap, j., Boratynski, j., Emerson, M., Gromadzki, G., Vahl, M. & 
Whyte, N. (2001) ‘Friendly Schengen Borderland Policy on the New Borders of an 
Enlarged EU and its Neighbours’, CEPS Policy Brief No. 7, Brussels: CEPS. 
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same time, as argued in a recent report by the Polish Institute for Eastern 
Studies, the Eastern region is itself highly diversified and therefore, one 
should avoid making general conclusions in this respect.16 The subsequent 
part of the paper gives an overview of the antecedents of ENP, from early 
thinking about the ‘Wider Europe’ in the run up to 2004 through to the 
various strategy papers, communications, reports and programming 
papers that gave rise to ENP and more recently EaP. In this section an 
overview of the ‘challenges’ and the ‘jobs to be done’, as detailed in key 
ENP documents is given. To keep things focused concentration is placed 
on the Politics/Governance parts of these documents. In the next part of 
the paper a broad-brush analysis of the implementation of ENP-East with 
reference to a range of progress reports and other indicators is presented 
and subsequent to this, the paper hones in on the case study on mobility 
and provides an assessment of the state of play. The closing part of this 
report addresses the question as to whether ENP / EaP implementation in 
the East represents a derisory score sheet, or whether there are reasons to 
be cheerful. By way of a final conclusion some ideas for the future contours 
and content of ENP-East are presented. 
16 Katarzyna Pelczynska Nalecz (2011) ‘Integration or Imitation? EU Policy towards 
its Eastern Neighbours’ OSW Studies, Warsaw, April 2011. 
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Researching the European Neighbourhood Policy –  
Food for Thought
Whilst an assessment of the implementation of ENP might sound like 
a straightforward case of policy analysis, there is a catalogue of research 
issues of relevance to the task in hand. A core question of any policy is that 
of implementation and evaluation, essentially is the policy working and 
what can be learnt to improve future implementation? When it comes to 
the case of the ENP, this paper argues that a number of factors need to be 
considered.
First, ENP is still a young policy, thus reliable indicators of success and 
failure are still elusive. Second, since ENP is made up of a heterogeneous 
group of states comparative analysis is tricky. There are obvious differences 
between the Southern and the Eastern neighbours, but there are also quite 
profound differences within the two regions in terms of (a) their overall 
degrees of willingness and interest in cooperating with the EU (b) the 
extent to which a pro-EU domestic consensus’ exist (c) the state of the 
legal frameworks that regulate neighbour-EU relations (d) the extent to 
which democracy has taken root in a partner state (e) whether a partner 
state seeks to become an actual member of the EU or not. It is argued here 
that research on the implementation of ENP needs to take account of such 
factors and variables. 
Next, there is a problem of the ‘measurability’ of instances of change 
brought about by ENP. It is problematic, for example, to demonstrate 
a causal link between ENP efforts at fostering democracy and freedom 
and evidence of actual change. Part of the problem is how to separate 
ENP effects from the efforts of other actors engaged in the region and 
to attribute a role to the EU. Furthermore, the EU itself has a plethora of 
funding sources attached to other non-ENPI instruments.17 Another point 
17 Such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the 
Instrument for Stability or the Nuclear Safety Instrument and thematic programmes 
under the Development Cooperation Instrument (e.g. for cooperation on migration 
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is that ENP timeframes are often imprecise, certainly until recently there 
were not enough short-term goals and objectives (part of the rationale of 
the setting up of the EaP was to address this and to press fast-forward in 
certain areas). Although Action Plans set out a ‘what needs to be done’ list 
within a given time frame (normally three-five years at the outset) actual 
benchmarking is not always precise in the implementation phase in terms 
of content and timeframes, the same goes for the subsequent auditing and 
assessment of projects. Consequently, this impacts heavily on attempts to 
assess the successes and failings of ENP. 
Next, though ENP follows the logic of accession-style conditionality 
based on the adoption / approximation to the Acquis Communitaire there 
are obvious differences at play here. The path to accession can be easily 
monitored and measured, the opening, negotiating and subsequent closing 
of chapters en route to membership can be tracked over time. In ENP the 
pattern is not the same, the actual adoption of the Acquis is not necessarily a 
prerequisite for ENP partners, thus there is not the same kind of measuring 
stick available to gauge the extent of implementation at any given moment. 
Moreover, one should recall that ENP Action Plans are political, not legal 
documents. Arguably the fact that states are either inside the enlargement 
dynamic or in ENP and are not expected to jump from one to the other is 
a factor affecting the implementation of ENP in the East. The point here 
is that in the absence of an end-game for ENP and with no membership 
perspective, the will of ENP states to respond wholeheartedly to EU 
overtures and to align domestic agendas with ENP provisions is curtailed.18 
As Kasia Wolczuk argues, for European integration to work ‘the EU needs 
to exercise a mobilising effect on a range of domestic actors’, clearly this has 
and asylum and for support to non-state actors and local actors) are also available to 
ENP states. The Instrument for Humanitarian Aid is also used and macro-financial 
assistance is given to some countries and since 2007 the neighbourhood Investment 
Fund and Governance facility.
18 See Tom Casier (2011) ‘To Adopt or Not to Adopt: Explaining Selective Rule Transfer 
under the European Neighbourhood Policy’ Journal of European Integration 33:1, 
pp.37-53. 
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great resonance in the case of ENP-East.19 The point here is that without 
its Ace-Card (membership), it is a question as to whether ENP is able to 
induce the types of change and depth of reform the EU hopes to see from 
its Eastern neighbours. In a nutshell - the fact that ENP is an alternative to 
membership limits the implementation scope in the East.
A further important point to stress is that of ‘indicators’ and sources of 
information, essentially which ones should be scrutinised? Where do we 
find our evidence? It is a bit of an open question as to what examples and 
case studies provide the best instances of successful or failed implementation 
of ENP. ‘Micro-level’ examples and case studies, such as a growth of SMEs 
or numbers of pro-EU NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
might provide a useful sign of bottom-up change. Measures of change 
in standards of living and other economic indicators (GDPs, corruption 
levels, income, trade with the EU etc.) also issue important signs of progress 
and prosperity towards EU/Western-standards which could be linked to 
ENP stimuli. Analysis of the wider picture in terms of the installation of 
functioning democratic systems and the ‘rule of law’, measured by election 
monitoring exercises might provide further relevant evidence. These ideas 
notwithstanding, to repeat the point made above, to attribute the positive 
influence of ENP as a driver of change is a difficult task and one that defies a 
water-tight response. The extent of contacts between EU officials and those 
from neighbouring states via summits, ministerial-level meetings and other 
visits might be worth noting to illustrate degrees of vibrancy in relations, 
but frequency of contact doesn’t tell us much about the content of relations 
and progress of ENP implementation. Documentary evidence based on EU 
Action Plan progress reviews and EU strategy papers provide significant 
insights, but mainly tell us the story from one-side. Official ENP progress 
reports are, after all, highly political documents. 
19 Kataryna Wolczuk (2007) Adjectival Europeanisation? The Impact of EU 
Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy, European 
Research Working Paper Series Number 18 European Research Institute http://www.
eri.bham.ac.uk/documents/research/wp18-wolczuk.pdf. 
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A final point is about the ways in which the momentum towards EU-
standards and expectations as set out in ENP Action Plans can be manifest 
in rather patchy and inconsistent ways. Broad sweeps of economic change 
towards market economies might proceed and exceed reforms in other 
areas. Indeed, this was one of the areas of concern presented in one of the 
2008 ENP Progress reports: ‘the pace of reform has slowed, particularly 
in democratic reforms and human rights standards’.20 If we take this 
on board we confront a problem when attempting to assess the overall 
implementation of ENP – how far can the EU accept economic reforms 
without far reaching democratic changes and commitments?
This report cannot address all of the points and issues raised above, but it 
will try to bear these ideas in mind.
20 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008, Brussels, 
23/04/2009 COM(2009) 188/3
 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/com09_188_en.pdf. 
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Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova were constituent parts of the Soviet Union. 
In this basic sense the three states had comparable starting points from 
which to begin their relations with the EU. Crucially, however, their paths 
of political and economic development, as well as their relations with 
the EU, tended to diversify somewhat over the course of the subsequent 
twenty years. From a current vantage point, relations between the EU and 
Belarusian government appears to rest upon mutual disavowal, meanwhile 
the position of top player in the region, which seemed to belong irrevocably 
to Ukraine has arguably been stolen by Moldova. Whilst the latter is still 
behind Ukraine in terms of negotiating an Association Agreement and a 
DCFTA, there is a palpable sense in Brussels that Moldova has become a 
model ENP-student by virtue of its commitment to pro-actively reform 
across a range of policy areas, a trend which is underpinned by a strong 
pro-EU consensus at home.
The implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened up new opportunities 
for relations with the EU to develop. The 1990s saw various experiments 
with democracy and on / off calls for integration with the West. At the 
same time Russia remained the dominant player, a presence reinforced by 
Russian minorities scattered across the region, and trade and especially 
energy dependencies lingering from Soviet times. Though increases in 
GDP per capita occurred since 1991, economic development has been 
patchy for the three neighbours and in most cases substantially set back 
by the recent global financial crisis.
In the following section the paper attempts to give a picture of the state of 
the region, in terms of basic indicators and trends. What are the domestic 
contexts? How much progress is being made in socio-economic terms? 
And what foreign policy trends can be tracked? 
18
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A Question of Wealth
The region is still profoundly poorer than the EU. Significantly, the gap far 
exceeds that which had existed between the EU and Central European states 
back in the 1990s. Indeed the space between wealth levels across the eastern 
border is still shocking, some twenty years since the end of the Soviet Empire. 
A recent study confirmed that Moldova’s GDP per capita equals only 9% of 
the average level of the EU, figures for Belarus and Ukraine equal 43% and 
21% respectively. Such derisory statistics notwithstanding, the same report 
noted that all three states have moved closer to EU levels in recent years, but 
evidently the pace of such shifts has varied sharply from country to country. 
Minsk is the leader in terms of playing economic catch-up with the EU, 
a situation best explained by Russian economic support, which of course 
has the effect of artificially bolstering the Belarusian economy and thus 
explains the apparent impressive state of affairs.21 This stands in contrast 
to the apparent sluggish pace of change in Ukraine and Moldova; the same 
report mentioned above, posits growth towards EU standards of wealth in 
these two states at 3% and 2% respectively. This is an interesting situation 
in many ways, not least due to the fact that of all of the Eastern neighbours 
(including the South Caucasus states) the two ‘closest’ and more advanced 
ENP states have experienced the slowest economic growth vis a vis EU 
standards.22 The most pressing questions that arise here is why ENP hasn’t 
delivered and whether DCFTAs with Ukraine and eventually Moldova will 
actually prove effective at rectifying this disappointing predicament. This 
is a particularly crucial issue given the current overtures from Moscow 
to Ukraine about joining a customs union with Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus. Such a prospect might seem increasingly attractive to the 
government in Kiev, especially if the negotiations on the DCFTA with the 
EU do not deliver a good deal, and quickly. 
21 Of course Azerbaijan is the leading ENP state in the East in terms of the speed of 
economic growth – a development underpinned by virtue of it being an energy 
provider.
22 Katarzyna Pelczynska Nalecz (2011) ‘Integration or Imitation? EU Policy towards 
its Eastern Neighbours’ OSW Studies, Warsaw, April 2011Pp.19-21.
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Despite some changes over recent years in the proportion of Ukrainian 
exports destined for EU markets, the EU27 remains Ukraine’s biggest single 
trading partner (29.3% of Ukrainian trade in 2009 was with the EU27), 
followed by Russia (25.4%) and then China, Kazakhstan and Turkey. Of 
course, looked at another way, if all Commonwealth of Independent States 
1 All figures, unless otherwise stated, come from:  
–  ‘Ukraine’  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113459.pdf 
 –  ‘Moldova’ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113419.pdf 
 –  ‘Belarus’ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113351.pdf. 
2 A jump to 37.9% is predicted for 2010Q3‘Ukraine, Main Economic Indicators’ http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113459.pdf. 
3 27.5% for 2010Q3 ‘Ukraine, Main Economic Indicators’ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113459.pdf. 
4 Projected 56% in 2010Q3.
5 Projected in 2010Q3.
6 Projected 21.8% in 2010Q3.
7 Projected 26.3% in 2010Q3.
Economic 
Contexts1
Ukraine Moldova Belarus
GDP per 
capita 
Euros 2010
2,265 1,133 4,229
Trade Ukraine’s Trade Balance  
with EU27
EU share of total imports  
in 2009: 34%.2 
EU share of total exports  
30.2% 2005 – 24% 2009.3
Main imports to EU from 
Ukraine: manufactured 
goods.
Main EU exports to Ukraine: 
Machinery and transport 
equipment.
Moldova’s Trade Balance  
with EU27
EU share of total imports  
in 2009: 43.6%.4
EU share of total exports  
38.7% 2005 - 52.4% 2009.5
Main imports to EU from 
Moldova: agricultural 
products.
Main EU exports to Moldova: 
fuels and mining products, 
machinery and transport 
equipment.
Belarus’ Trade Balance  
with EU27
EU share of total imports  
in 2009: 23%.6 
EU share of total exports 
44.7% 2005 – 43.8% 2009.7
Main imports to EU from 
Belarus: fuel and mining 
products, chemicals.
Main EU exports to Belarus: 
machinery and transport 
equipment.
TAbLE 1: bASIC ECoNomIC INDICAToRS AND TRADE WITh EU27
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are added together, the CIS grouping becomes the most significant trade 
partner for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Moldova is the only one of the three 
states that has experienced marked growth in its export activity to the 
EU. Of Moldova’s trade partners the EU outstrips Russia by a long way. 
In 2009 46.1% of Moldovan trade activity was with the EU27, compared 
with 14.5% with Russia, which is followed by Ukraine, China and Belarus. 
Even if the CIS states are lumped together as a trade entity, the EU27 still 
remains the most significant trade partner for Moldova. Belarus presents a 
different picture for reasons already noted. Consequently, Russia remains 
the major trade partner, above EU27 (47.2% and 31.0% of Belarusian trade 
is conducted with these entities respectively).
21
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States, Democracy and Foreign Policies
 The states in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood are fragile democracies at best. 
In the 1990’s there were various democratic experiments but largely with 
previous elites remaining in power. Crucially, the democratic footing of the 
newly independent states in the 1990’s was thwarted by protracted economic 
problems and instability associated with post-communist transformations, 
ambiguous relations with Russia and in the case of Moldova by territorial 
conflict over Transdnistria. This situation was not helped by the lack of a 
strategic foreign policy from the EU, which arguably let the region languish 
for at least a decade. It is worth remembering that it was only really on the eve 
of the 2004 enlargement that the EU put its collective minds together to think 
about what to do with the soon-to-be new neighbours to the East. 
The continued fragility of democracy in this region is manifest in elections 
which more often than not do not meet basic international standards. 
Moreover, as will be discussed later, corruption remains endemic and a real 
block to processes of modernisation and effectiveness of opposition forces. 
Divisions persist between reform versus conservative forces; Westernisers and 
pro-Europeans versus pro-Russian elites and also between different ethnic, 
regional or language groups to greater or lesser extents in the three countries. 
Thus on questions of the state, democracy and identity, the countries in 
the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood present a quite different picture than East 
Central European did prior to the route to EU membership. Already by 
the early 1990’s states like Poland and Hungary had emerged as secure 
and relatively stable democracies, based on largely uncontested territorial 
integrity, clear national identities and on a course to ‘return to Europe’, whilst 
for the former Soviet Republics, with their rather fuzzy sense of sovereignty 
and geopolitical precariousness, sandwiched between East and West, the 
yolk of Soviet tutelage has taken much longer to throw off – a factor which 
continues to shape the new neighbours’ relations with the EU. 
A final point relevant here relates to conflicts and protest; their sources, 
motives and consequences and what they say about the EU’s immediate 
22
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TAbLE 2: GoVERNANCE AND DEmoCRACY IN ThE REGIoN
Current Government
Ukraine
Viktor Yanukovych won 
the 2010 Presidential 
elections, which were 
deemed free and fair.1 
Subsequently, however, 
authoritarian tendencies 
have returned and the 
legacy of the Orange 
Revolution seems to have 
evaporated.
Moldova
After a long period of post-
communist authoritarian 
rule, punctuated by 
violent anti-government 
protests and stalemate in 
the electoral process in 
2009/10 the Alliance for 
European Integration is 
now in power and a decisive 
focus on EU integration and 
democratisation has ensued. 
Belarus
Lukashenko has been in 
power since 1994. The 
Presidential office controls 
all political institutions, 
and the electoral process. 
Lukashenko won the 
Presidential elections in 
December 2010 for the 
fourth time with a result 
of 80%.2
Appraisal of Democratic Governance 
Ukraine might be a 
democracy, but does not 
function efficiently as one. 
The chief problem being 
the uneven application 
of the rule of law and its 
corrupt use for political / 
economic gain by elites. 
This entails an often futile 
judicial system open 
to political influence, 
coupled with rampant 
corruption. Opposition 
forces exist in Ukraine, 
though as seen in the 
course of the demise of 
the Orange Revolution 
they are often disparate. 
Key opposition figures are 
warning of the prospect 
of a pro-Russian re-
orientation. 
Democracy seems 
to have taken hold 
in Moldova and has 
brought an overtly pro-
European governing 
alliance to power. This 
rosy state of affairs 
should not be taken for 
granted however, since 
the rule of law remains 
patchy and corruption 
remains pervasive. 
The static situation in 
Transdnistria severely 
hampers fundamental 
reform and state-
building in Moldova. 
There is less to say about 
the situation in Belarus. 
Despite some modest 
peaks in EU-Belarus 
relations over the past 
twenty years when the 
regime in Minsk seemed 
capable of making 
some concessions, the 
political system has not 
fundamentally changed, 
indeed authoritarianism 
and repression of 
opposition forces has 
worsened over the 
course of the past year.
1 See Sabine Fischer ‘Has the EU Lost Ukraine?’, EUISS Analysis, February 2010 
 http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Has_the_EU_lost_Ukraine.pdf.
2 The Economist. A nasty surprise in Belarus. 29.12.2010 http://www.economist.com/
node/17800131.
23
Chapter 2. Who are the Eastern Neighbours? 
Neighbours and Borders
Ukraine
Borders with Russia, 
Belarus, Moldova, 
Romania. Schengen 
states: Hungary, 
Slovakia, Poland 
Moldova
Borders with Romania, 
Ukraine. Schengen 
states: none (until 
Romania joins Schengen, 
probably in 2012)
Belarus
Borders with Russia, 
Ukraine, Schengen 
states: Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania
Strategies and Tendencies
A foreign policy 
balancing a recalibrated 
pro-Russian tilt 
alongside a recognition 
of the rewards to be 
reaped from allegiance 
to the West and 
cooperation with the 
EU. The fading of the 
Orange revolution in 
foreign policy terms 
has seen major steps 
forwards in Ukraine-
Russia strategic 
relations.1 Kiev’s interest 
in the proposed customs 
union with Russia will 
prove to be a potent 
indicator of the Russia / 
EU balance in Ukraine’s 
future foreign policy 
orientation.
The government in 
Chisinau is certainly pro-
European. This is backed 
by a profoundly pro-EU 
population. Relations 
with the EU should 
persist in a positive 
direction as the coming 
year foresees progress in 
negotiations on a new 
Association Agreement, 
DCFTA and visa 
liberalisation. Moldova’s 
relations with Romania 
and Russia have entered 
a quiet phase, though 
as regards the latter, 
deadlock in 
Transnistria remains an 
open wound with the 
prospect of EU-Russia 
discord emerging.
Russia is the partner 
for Belarus in political, 
economic and security 
terms.2 It is unlikely 
that this will change in 
the near future, at least 
from the perspective 
of Minsk. The EU will 
have to up the ante if 
any degree of change in 
the regime’s openness is 
to occur. EU – Belarus 
relations have again 
hardened; one can 
expect a more punative 
stance from the EU vis a 
vis the regime in Minsk. 
TAbLE 3: FoREIGN PoLICY ISSUES AND GEoPoLITICS
1 The Ukrainian government agreed to the extension of the agreement with Russia for 
the stationing of the latter’s Black Sea Fleet as a quid pro quo for a renegotiation of key 
energy agreements.
2 Eastern Partnership Community website. http://www.easternpartnership.org/partner-
states/belarus.
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Eastern neighbours. Pelcynska-Nalecz points to the fact that protests, 
‘revolutions’ and crises in the neighbouring states over the past ten years 
have been of both a ‘constructive and destructive’ nature. Her argument is 
that ‘Crisis situations in the East have taken a great variety of forms over the 
past decade and should absolutely not be seen as a measure of the region’s 
instability.23 Indeed the effects of a number of citizen-based protests in the 
region served in some cases to push-back trends towards authoritarianism 
and in the case of Moldova (2009) led to further democratisation and, 
as noted above, heralded a new era in Moldova’s approach to European 
integration. In this case, this paper concurs with Pelcynska-Nalecz’s analysis 
that this political crisis was of a ‘constructive nature’, rather than being 
an indicator of inherent instability. In contrast, the case of Transdnistria, 
which is surely the most frozen of the region’s frozen conflicts, continues 
to have a destructive effect on the socio-economic well-being of Moldova, 
its physical integrity and state-building endeavours.
23 Katarzyna Pelczynska Nalecz (2011) ‘Integration or Imitation? EU Policy towards 
its Eastern Neighbours’ OSW Studies, Warsaw, April 2011 p.25.
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Chapter 3. In the Absence of Enlargement
The EC’s immediate response to the break-up of the Soviet Union was TACIS 
(Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States), which from 
1991 until 2006 provided the financial framework for relations with Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus to support the process of ‘transition to market economies 
and democratic societies in the countries of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus 
and Central Asia’. Simultaneously the EU embarked upon designing a first 
generation of legal ‘Partnership and Cooperation Agreements’ (PCAs).
1 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/ukraine_99.pdf.  
2 Non-Paper “What the European Union could bring to Belarus”  
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/documents/eu_belarus/non_paper_1106.pdf.  
Early Relations with the EU post-1991
Political and 
Legal Basis
Ukraine
EU Common Strategy 
for Ukraine (1999) 
acknowledged Ukraine’s 
‘European aspirations and 
pro-European choice’.1 
Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement 
came into force in 1998.
Moldova
Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement 
came into force in 1998.
In 2003 Moldova 
presented a concept for 
the integration of the 
republic of Moldova to the 
European Union.
Belarus
Relations still governed by 
the Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement. 
PCA signed in March 1995, 
but is not in force.
Indications of the EU 
vision of future relations 
with Belarus are presented 
in the Non-Paper
‘What the European Union 
could bring to Belarus’, 
which, inter alia sets out 
‘When Belarus becomes 
a full participant in our 
neighbourhood policy, and 
thus a full partner of the 
EU, the EU would be able 
to help to improve quality 
of life of the Belarusian 
people.2
ENP Action  
Plan
Adopted 2005. Adopted 2005. n/a 
TAbLE 4: ThE EASTERN NEIGhboURS AND ThE EU
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Meanwhile the EU was looking to the immediate East to those states with 
which it shared land borders and who had a genuine and quite vocal claim on 
being European and to having a place in the process of European integration. 
Based on the logic of proximity, the neighbours in Central Europe were the 
first to enter the EU’s orbit by securing their bilateral relations in the early 
1990’s, which led ultimately to EU membership in 2004/7. Crucially, the 
prospect of EU membership has been used since the 1990’s as an effective 
inducement for neighbours to enact the necessary reforms to move closer 
to the EU. No surprise therefore, that enlargement is regarded as one of the 
EU’s most effective foreign policy tools.24 Whilst the enlargement dynamic 
continues to determine relations between the EU and the current and 
potential candidates, it is not an available foreign policy tool with which the 
EU can structure its relations with the remaining neighbours. Thus the EU 
was compelled to develop a policy, distinct from enlargement, to bring about 
security via political and economic changes in the new neighbourhood. In 
the following section I give a very brief synopsis of developments.
Most commentators track early conceptual thinking about what became 
ENP from letters sent by the British and Swedish Foreign Ministers to the 
Spanish EU Presidency, during the first half of 2002. Similar overtures 
were developed in a letter drafted by javier Solana and Chris Patten 
(then Commissioner for External Relations) later the same year to the 
Council about the ‘Wider Europe’. Solana and Patten spoke of the dual 
challenge of avoiding new dividing lines in Europe, whilst at the same time 
responding to the needs and opportunities arising from the newly created 
borders of the Union. Particular emphasis was placed upon the soon to be 
eastern neighbours, since, as they argued, the Eastern region was where 
the impacts of enlargement would be of most consequence. Indeed, this 
early thinking and original blueprint for what eventually became the ENP, 
was for a regionally discrete EU ‘proximity’ instrument geared to nurture 
relations with these three states. 
24 ‘Wider Europe: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours’ http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf p.5.
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The Commission launched its ‘Wider Europe: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ initiative in 
March 2003: 
 (…) In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared 
values and effective implementation of political, economic 
and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation 
with the Acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from 
the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU. To 
this end, Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and the 
Southern Mediterranean should be offered the prospect of 
a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration 
and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, 
goods, services and capital (four freedoms). 
The EU can and should work to spread the benefits of 
enlargement for political and economic stability in the 
neighbouring countries and to help reduce prosperity gaps 
where they exist. (….) The EU should (...) work with the 
partners to reduce poverty and create an area of shared 
prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration, 
intensified political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-
border cooperation and shared responsibility for conflict 
prevention between the EU and its neighbours.25
Subsequent to the Wider Europe Communication the Commission 
issued the ‘Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument’ 
communication;26 on ‘how to do it’, with a focus on utilising existing funding 
tools for the neighbourhood (MEDA, TACIS, CARDS, INTERREG and so 
on) with a view to the creation of a new comprehensive instrument. The 
25 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours Brussels, 11.3.2003. 
COM (2003) 104 final p.4 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf.
26 Brussels, 1 july 2003 COM(2003) 393 final communication from the commission 
Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument http://ec.europa.eu/world/
enp/pdf/com03_393_en.pdf. 
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2004 European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper was released shortly 
after the accession of ten new member states into the EU: 
The European Neighbourhood Policy’s vision involves a ring of 
countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives, 
drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond 
co-operation to involve a significant measure of economic 
and political integration. This will bring enormous gains to 
all involved in terms of increased stability, security and well 
being. (…). The next step could consist in the negotiation of 
European Neighbourhood Agreements, to replace the present 
generation of bilateral agreements (…).27
The scope of this report permits only a brief reference to the conceptual 
evolution of ENP as a whole, which is presented in the following table:
27 Brussels, 12.5.2004 COM(2004) 373 final communication from the Commission 
European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/
pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf p. 5.
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Identifying the Challenges and the Jobs to be Done 
The ENP implementation process kicked-off with the production of 
Country Reports (CRs) in May 2004. The CRs provide an important insight 
into what were viewed as the ‘challenges’ or problem areas in each ENP 
state as seen by the Commission, to which ENP Action Plans (APs) were 
subsequently designed to address. This paper only highlights some key 
aspects and for reasons of brevity concentrates on political issues, broadly 
speaking. The following analysis of ENP CRs builds on the discussion 
presented earlier in Chapter Two of this paper. 
The Country Report on Ukraine pointed to the shaky state of democracy, 
intransparency and lack of good governance and the leadership’s proclivity to 
enact constitutional amendments in the run up to elections.28 judicial reform 
and efficiency was seen as lacking, with strong tendencies persisting for 
corruption and a general vulnerability of the judiciary to ‘political interference’. 
Connected to this was reference to standards in the civil service, where 
impartiality, integrity and ‘professional stability’ were seen as problem areas. 
Indeed, the theme of corruption and the fight against organised crime in all 
its guises was prominent in this CR. The report notes that Ukraine scored a 
derisory 2.3 / 10 in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index (2003) placing it in 106th place. This amongst other factors, it was noted, 
repels FDI. Hopes were pinned on the Presidential Decree of 2003, which 
instructed the government to adopt measures to combat corruption, to be 
adopted up to 2010. In this context measures to uncover corrupt conduct of 
government officials and the misappropriation of state funds were singled 
out. On the theme of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the basic 
line is that Ukraine had already signed up to most international human 
rights instruments, but their implementation remains unfinished business. 
For example, it was noted that Ukraine hadn’t yet fulfilled all obligations and 
commitments relating to its membership of the Council of Europe. 
28 Commission Staff Working Paper, European Neighbourhood Policy Country 
Report Ukraine (COM (2004) 373 final) Brussels 12.5.2004, SEC (2004) 566 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/ukraine_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf.
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The Country Report on Moldova cited that in the main, legal frameworks 
for democratic elections existed, and noted that elections have been 
judged as free and fair, but with irregularities for example in the secrecy 
of voting, intimidation of opposition candidates, media bias and so on.29 
Like in Ukraine, corruption was viewed as entrenched and made worse by 
inefficient judicial systems and insufficient political willingness to tackle 
it. Transparency International ranked Moldova in 100th place. And the 
Council of Europe’s group of states against corruption (GRECO) saw that 
Moldova was one of the countries most deeply affected by corruption. The 
CR cited low ethical and professional standards of public functionaries as 
contributing to problems of corruption. The extent and entrenched nature 
of poverty was also seen as a strong contributing factor in this regard. 
In response to this, the government in Chisinau had already instigated 
a number of measures; focussing on better legal frameworks and more 
transparent financial environment. The CR noted that in the area of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms since Moldova had already adhered to 
most International instruments, the ‘environment was favourable’ for the 
development of civil society. The problem lay, it was argued, in the actual 
implementation of international standards and practices in the human 
rights area. The situation of the break-away region of Transdnistria was 
highlighted. It is not internationally recognised and the ruling regime 
seems averse to reaching any solution that would fundamentally alter the 
status quo. The CR noted the sizeable negative economic and political 
implications stemming from the Transdnistria situation for the Moldovan 
state and its chances for successfully reforming.
It is valuable to reflect a little on the Action Planning process, since these 
documents detail the range of reforms required by the EU of the neighbours 
and thus can provide a marker by which actual implementation can be 
29 Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 12.5.2004 SEC(2004) 567 
Commission Staff Working Paper European Neighbourhood Policy Country Report 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/moldova_enp_country_report_2004_
en.pdf. 
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evaluated. For all intents and purposes APs are the public face of the 
ENP’s objectives. In the table below some of the most salient aspects of 
the Moldovan and Ukrainian ENP Action Plans of 2005 are presented. 
TAbLE 6:  UKRAINE AND moLDoVA ENP ACTIoN PLANS –  
oVERVIEW oF ‘PoLITICAL DIALoGUE’ 
Category Ukraine Moldova
Political 
dialogue / 
reform
Further strengthen the 
stability and effectiveness 
of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy and the rule 
of law. Ensuring the 
democratic conduct of 
presidential (2004) and 
parliamentary (2006) 
elections.
Join the Council of Europe 
Group of States Against 
Corruption (GRECO) 
and implement relevant 
recommendations, 
including a revision of 
the Ukrainian national 
strategy for the fight 
against corruption; 
Promote transparency 
and accountability of 
the administration, in 
particular concerning 
the reform of the civil 
service based on European 
standards; Further EU 
involvement in supporting 
the OSCE and mediators, 
in the conflict resolution 
process on Transdnistria, 
towards a viable solution.
Guaranteeing democracy 
and the rule of law. 
Ensuring the democratic 
conduct of Parliamentary 
Elections in 2005.
Ensure progress in 
implementing the 
recommendations of 
the Council of Europe 
Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO). Put 
in place and implement 
appropriate legal 
framework guaranteeing 
the freedom of expression 
and of the media, in line 
with European standards 
and on the basis of the 
recommendations of 
the Council of Europe. 
Continue and develop 
political dialogue and 
cooperation with the EU 
on Transdnistria, regional 
and international issues, 
including within the 
framework of Council of 
Europe and OSCE
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What can be deduced from this brief synopsis is an emphasis upon the 
installation of the rule of law and establishment of good governance, with a 
focus upon tackling corruption, civil service reform and securing positive 
electoral outcomes in line with OSCE and international standards. 
The task of assessing the implementation of ENP in Belarus is not the same 
as it is for Ukraine and Moldova. For one, although Belarus is a recipient 
of funds via the ENPI, amongst other streams, there is still no PCA in 
place and subsequently there is no AP by which one can measure levels of 
implementation and to gauge the effects of the EU in the same way as any 
other ENP state. The ENPI country strategy paper for Belarus sees that: 
‘The long-term goal of the EU is for Belarus to become a democratic, stable, 
reliable, and increasingly prosperous partner with which the enlarged EU 
will share not only common borders but also a common agenda driven 
by shared values’.30
The background to the current state of affairs began in the mid-1990s, 
when, as a consequence of setbacks in the democratisation process, a 
firm halt to the type of relationships which were developing between the 
EU and Ukraine and Moldova was arrived at. It was the introduction of 
an authoritarian regime by Lukashenko during 1996/7 which signalled 
the beginning of the end of hopes for an open and democratic Belarus 
willing to meet EU overtures. EU policy vis a vis Belarus has subsequently 
remained on two tracks (a) restrictions on government contacts and (b) 
fostering of links with and assistance for democratic forces and actors 
in civil society.31 The EU’s strategy has been manifest in the freezing of 
30 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Belarus Country 
Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and National Indicative Programme 2007-2011 p.5 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_belarus_en.pdf
31 European External Action Service, information on EU relations with Belarus: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/belarus/index_en.htm. See also What the European Union 
could bring to Belarus. 2006. Non-paper. http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/
documents/eu_belarus/non_paper_1106.pdf see also Kerry Longhurst (ed.). 2009. 
Forging a new European Ostpolitik – An Assessment of the Eastern Partnership. 
Warsaw: Collegium Civitas Studies and Analyses. www.cfss.eu.
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the conclusion of the PCA (thus ensuring Belarus’ exclusion from full 
participation in ENP/EaP); travel /visa restrictions placed on government 
officials. Together with this, various carrots have been offered in line with 
the notions that: 
‘Community and Member States’ assistance programmes will 
support the needs of the population and democratisation, 
notably by humanitarian, regional, cross-border cooperation 
and by projects supporting directly or indirectly democratisation 
and democratic forces in Belarus’. 32
EU assistance has proceeded along ‘people-to-people’ channels; student and 
scientific exchanges, scholarships, contacts between small- and medium 
sized enterprises, the training of local authority officials and coordination 
between officials working in certain sectors; migration, visas and border 
management figure quite highly in this respect.33
A possible breakthrough seemed to be on the horizon in 2008/9 when small 
steps towards greater openness were made by the Belarusian government. 
This spurred a reengagement on the part of the EU, with the GAERC 
Council of November 2009 asking the Commission to set about drafting 
a ‘shadow’ ENP-type Action Plan. Though by all accounts this window of 
opportunity for change was bolted shut soon after and the AP never saw 
the light of day. 
EU policy remains on this two-track approach after the December 2010 
elections. What seems to be transpiring is a renewed push from the EU 
to offer more to the Belarusian people, to sideline the government (for 
example reinstating the visa ban for a larger number of government 
officials) even more overtly and to accelerate relations with civil society 
groups via an enhanced EU charm offensive replete with more funding 
32 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument – Belarus, Country Strategy 
Paper 2007-2013 and National Indicative Programme 2007-2011. p.5. http://
ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_belarus_en.pdf. 
33 ENPI Belarus Country Strategy Paper Ibid p. 18.
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and a more overt disavowal for Lukashenko. The soundings of a more 
robust stance from the EU can be witnessed in an Op Ed. written by the 
Foreign Ministers of Sweden, Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland, 
in which they argued that: 
Our many conversations with representatives of different parts 
of Belarus society have convinced us that the country wants to 
be part of a free and prosperous Europe. We must now deepen 
our engagement with the democrats of Belarus and those inside 
the government who disapprove of the fateful turn their country 
has taken. They must not be abandoned or betrayed as their 
country enters what might be a new dark era.34 
34 Letter by Ministers of Foreign Affairs – Carl Bildt, Karel Schwarzenberg, Radek 
Sikorski and Guido Westerwelle, Lukashenko the Loser. The New York Times. 
23 December 2010.
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The Eastern Partnership –  
An Improvement on the EU’s offer?
As was noted above, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which was inaugurated 
in May 2009 was driven by the perceived need to provide a dedicated 
framework to enhance the EU’s relations with its Eastern ENP partners. 
The initiative was also a response to the Union for the Mediterranean, 
which now seems to of run aground, but at least at the beginning appeared 
to be a possible exclusive alternative to ENP and a tool to dislodge the EU’s 
existing ‘balanced’ approach.35 
What does EaP bring to the party? On the face of it EaP offers a number 
of innovations, both of a procedural and substantive nature. The initiative 
gains profile via biennial EaP summits, the first of which was held in 
Prague in 2009. The next will take place in Warsaw later in 2011 during the 
Polish EU Presidency. The structure of EaP also aims to bring coherence 
and attention to EU endeavours through the so-called thematic platforms: 
(i) Democracy and Good Governance (ii) Energy Security (iii) Economic 
integration and convergence with the EU and (iv) People to People 
Contacts. Flagship Initiatives also represent EaP’s ‘cherry on the cake’ 
approach. In this domain sizable amounts of money are earmarked for 
(i) Integrated Border Management (ii) Regional Energy Markets, energy 
efficiency and renewable energy (iii) SMEs (iv) Environment Policy (v) 
Diversification of the supply of energy (vi) Preparedness and Responses 
to natural and manmade disasters. Beyond this, EaP tries to reach the 
parts that ENP has not via the EURONEST parliamentary assembly, an 
assembly of regional and local authorities, the EaP Civil Society Forum 
and possibly a Business Forum. 
If the architects of EaP took issue with some of the failings of ENP and 
sought to elevate the position of the Eastern neighbours as ‘European 
35 See Kerry Longhurst and Susanne Nies ‘Recasting Relations with the Neighbours – 
Prospects for the Eastern Partnership’ IFRI Europe Visions 4, 2009 http://www.ifri.
org/files/Europe_visions/Europe_Visions_4.pdf. 
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neighbours’, as opposed to ‘neighbours of Europe’, there is still a profound 
ambiguity at the heart of the project, namely the lack of a clear end-game. 
Moreover, as will be explored later, the EaP’s emphasis on multilateral 
cooperation as a supplement to ENP’s traditional bilateralism is not 
necessarily reaping the results expected in a swift enough fashion. This 
point will be returned to in the final portion of this report.
Budgeting for ENP – Putting the Money where the Mouth is
The vast majority of funding designated for ENP from the ENPI envelope 
is organised on a national basis, as opposed to multi-country or regionally-
based funding, which is small-fry in comparison.36 The following table 
breaks down the basic categories and division of resources. 
36 States are eligible to get funds from other sources, such as the Nuclear Safety 
Cooperation Instrument, EIDR, Macroeconomic aid, the Development and 
cooperation instrument and the Instrument for stability. EIB loans are also available 
to ENP-East states (and Russia) 3.7 Billion Euros and a further 1.5 Billion Euros 
from the Eastern partners facility.
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TAbLE 7: EU FUNDING FoR ThE NEIGhboURS 2007-2013 – ThE bASICS 
Category Funds Example of Assistance
Total Amount  
2007-2013
11.2 Billion Euros1 –  
the ‘financial envelope’  
of ENPI
For all ENP partners and Russia
Country  
Programmes – East 
2.51 Billion Euros Supporting states’ implementation 
of political, governance, economic 
and social reform programmes in 
six ENP states, plus Russia.
Regional  
Cooperation – East
Supra-Regional
(For all ENP states)
485 Million Euros
1.23 Billion Euros2
Regional Programme East funding 
includes support for cooperation 
between ENP countries and EU 
states and ENP countries on border, 
migration and asylum management 
initiatives and systems with the goal of 
establishing regional and sub-regional 
cooperation mechanisms (20-30% of 
Eastern Regional Programme funds).3 
Cross-Border – East 423 Million Euros Supporting cooperation between 
local and regional authorities on 
both sides of the EU’s external 
border.
Governance Facility 
(GF) 
Neighbourhood 
Investment Facility 
(NIF)
Eastern Partnership
350 Million Euros
700 Million Euros4
Additional funds of 350 
Million Euros taken 
from the budget reserve. 
plus a further 250 
Million Euros advanced 
GF funds awarded to those ENP 
states as reward for advances in 
the area of good governance (only 
for neighbours with actual Action 
Plans, thus Belarus is excluded).
In 2008 37.23 million Euros of 
NIF monies were used to co-
fund eight projects in the Eastern 
neighbourhood. 
 
1  Regulation (EC) no 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=Oj
:L:2006:310:0001:0014:EN:PDF. 
2  Of that 450 Million Euros researved for the Neighbourhood Investment Facility.
3 See ENPI Eastern Regional Programme Strategy Paper 2007-2013.
4 Added to this are contributions to the pot from member states.
39
Chapter 3. In the Absence of Enlargement
TAbLE 8: bREAKDoWN INTo CoUNTRY PRoGRAmmES 2007-2010
UKRAINE1: 494 Million Euros
PRIORITY 
AREAS
Democratic Development 
and Good Governance 148.2 
Million Euros (30%). Sub-
priorities include: public 
administration reform; rule 
of law and judicial reform; 
human rights and civil society; 
education, science and people 
Regulatory reforms and 
administrative capacity 
building 148.2 Million Euros 
(30%) Sub-priorities include: 
improving trade/investment 
climate; administrative capacity
Infrastructure 197.6 Million 
Euros (40%) Sub-priorities 
include: environment; 
energy; transport and border 
management (including 
readmission related issues). 
MOLDOVA2 2007-2010 209.7 Million Euros
PRIORITY 
AREAS
Democratic Development 
and Good Governance 52.4 
– 73.4 Million Euros (25-
35%). Sub-priorities include: 
public administration reform; 
public finance reform; rule of 
law and judicial reform; human 
rights, civil society and local 
government; education, science 
and people to people contacts.
Regulatory reforms and 
administrative capacity 
building 31.5 – 41.9 Million 
Euros (15-20%) Sub-
priorities include: improving 
trade/investment climate; 
administrative capacity; sector 
specific reforms
Poverty reduction and 
economic growth 83.9-
125.8 million euros (40-
60%) Priorities include: 
meeting Moldova’s Millenium 
development goals; improving 
infrastructures at local and 
regional levels; improving 
border and customs regimes.
BELARUS 2007-2011
PRIORITY 
AREAS
Social and Economic Development (70%) Sub-
priorities include local and regional economic 
development, emphasis on those areas affected 
by the Chernobyl disaster; public health sector; 
establishing cross-border business links; 
regulatory reform and capacity building including 
in border management area. 
Democratic Development and Good 
Governance (30%) Sub-priorities include working 
on people to people contacts, medium-level 
officials, NGOs etc. Disseminating information on 
EU activities and promoting exchanges.
An allocation of 20 Million Euros was originally set for 2007-2010, after advances in EU-
Belarus relations in 2008 more funds were earmarked to bring the figure up to 46.7 Million 
Euros (which includes funds from the EaP Comprehensive Institution Building fund).3
1 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Ukraine National Indicative Programme 
2007-2010 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_nip_ukraine_en.pdf. 
2 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Republic of Moldova National Indicative 
Programme 2007-2010 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_nip_moldova_en.pdf. 
3 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Belarus Country Strategy Paper 2007-
2013 and National Indicative Programme 2007-2011.
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Evaluating ENP in the East – A broad brush Appraisal
The analysis and data surveyed above give a taste of the ambitions and 
priorities of ENP in the three countries from the early 1990s up until the 
present day. How though to evaluate actual implementation? What follows is 
a broad brush assessment of the implementation of ENP from its inception 
to the present day. Two main sources are referred to: ENP progress reviews 
and then selected international measures. 
TAbLE 9: ThE STATE oF PLAY IN ENP-EAST
Relations with the EU 
Legal Bases Ukraine
An Association Agreement 
has been in negotiation since 
2007; alongside negotiations on 
an EU-Ukraine DCFTA.1 The 
Commission is hopeful that 
negotiations will conclude by 
the end of this year. Progress 
may hasten in light of Moscow’s 
offer to the government in 
Kiev of a customs union. An 
Association Agenda was signed 
in 2009 as a replacement for the 
previous ENP Action Plan. 
Moldova
Negotiations began in 
2010 for a new Association 
Agreement to replace the 
previous PCA. Negotiations 
for an EU-Moldova DCFTA 
should commence in earnest 
in 2011.
Belarus
No change. 
As a result of the elections 
and the subsequent 
government clampdown, 
the Council of the European 
Union imposed travel 
restrictions for a larger 
number of Belarusian 
officials2
Key Areas 
of Deeper 
Cooperation
Visa Facilitation / Readmission 
Agreements in place.
Action Plan on further Visa 
liberalisation offered in 2010.
Accession to European Energy 
Community on line.
Visa Facilitation / Readmission 
Agreements in place.
Action Plan on further Visa 
Liberalisation offered in 2010.
Accession to European Energy 
Community on line.
No change.
The EU has said that talks 
on visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements 
could start once better 
political conditions transpire 
in Belarus.3 
1 http://www.easternpartnership.org/partner-states/ukraine.
2 Council Conclusions on Belarus: www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press-
data/EN/foraff/119038.pdf; See also: EU confirms sanctions against Belarus http://www.
easternpartnership.org/daily-news/2011-02-07/eu-confirms-sanctions-against-belarus.
3 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Belarus Country Strategy Paper 
2007-2013 and National Indicative Programme 2007-2011 http://ec.europa.eu/world/
enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_belarus_en.pdf. 
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The ENP progress reports that accompanied the review of 2006 and the 
Commission Communication ‘Strengthening the ENP’ are a logical place 
to start. The Overall Assessment’ of ENP, presented in December 2006, 
draws attention to the heterogeneous make-up of ENP. ENP states have 
varied priorities and capacities to implement AP priorities, thus judging 
change and progress across the neighbourhood as a whole needs to take 
full account of national specificities, it was argued.37 In its conclusions the 
progress report saw that:
The ENP is a young policy (...). The ambitious reform agendas 
set out in the agreed Action Plans can only be achieved in 
the longer haul, and much remains to be done. Nevertheless 
(...) the first eighteen months of implementation have laid the 
groundwork for significant progress – and this is reflected in 
notable developments across many policy areas. The EU must 
now take steps to further strengthen the ENP (...).38
Useful discussions can be found in the individual country reports. In the case 
of Ukraine the ‘free and fair’ elections of 2006 are viewed as the democratic 
breakthrough and a logical consequence of the Orange revolution. Similar 
positive tones are heard regarding Kiev’s stance on a number of international 
and regional issues. The EU applauded Ukraine’s positive role in contributing 
to regional integration and the security of borders. The protection of civil 
rights and installation of the rule of law were moving in the right direction, 
the report argues, but endemic corruption and lack of an independent 
judiciary continues to present the major roadblock to the embedding of 
democracy.39 The EU’s overall assessment for Moldova a year after the start 
37 Commission of the European Communities. Commission staff working document 
accompanying the: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy overall 
assessment, Brussels, 4 december 2006 COM (2006) 726 final. p.2.
38 Ibid. p. 6.
39 Commission of the European Communities. Commission Staff Working document 
Accompanying the: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy ENP 
Progress Report Ukraine, Brussels, 4 December 2006, COM(2006) 726 final. P.2.
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of ENP was that it was ‘showing commitment’.40 In a very difficult internal 
and external environment, where bad governance and corruption runs 
endemic, the EU saw that the ENP Action Plan had become an anchor for 
a host of domestic reforms. 
2007 saw the beginnings of a broad sweep of changes brought to ENP. The 
outcomes of these processes recalibrated priorities and set forth a more 
ambitious agenda for the EU and neighbours alike, as was noted earlier in 
this paper. On April 3rd 2008 the Commission published its assessment of the 
implementation of ENP for the preceding year.41 This time there was more in 
terms of concrete progress to be reported given that it had been almost three 
years since the Moldovan and Ukrainian APs had been adopted. However, 
just as importantly, building on the Commission’s Communication on 
strengthening the ENP of December 2006, efforts had gained apace on 
thinking about how to improve the implementation of ENP – a process 
stewarded to a large extent by the German Presidency of the EU in the first 
half of 2007.42 One of the most important outcomes to consider here is the 
Commission Communication ‘A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy 
of December 2007. In this context it was seen that: 
The ENP is a partnership for reform that offers “more for 
more”: the more deeply a partner engages with the Union, the 
more fully the Union can respond, politically, economically 
and through financial and technical cooperation. As the 
partnerships develop, within the common ENP framework, the 
policy’s operation is becoming increasingly differentiated.43
40 Ibid.
41 Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 3 April 2008 com (2008) 
164 Communication from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council 
Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007 http://ec.europa.
eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2008/com08_164_en.pdf. 
42 For the report prepared by the German Presidency see 10874/07 of 15.6.2007. 
 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10874.en07.pdf.
43 Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 05/12/2007 COM(2007) 774 final 
Communication from the Commission A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy 
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Notions of ‘more for more’ and greater ‘differentiation’ subsequently became 
leitmotifs for the future evolution of ENP, and from the vantage point of 
2011 these concepts have become ever more pertinent. The Commission 
stressed the priority of focusing on implementation and in particular what 
the EU needs to do to ensure the optimal delivery of the policy: – How ENP is 
organised and conceptualised (ownership, regional activities, differentiation); 
Key improvements and upgrades to the ‘offers’ being made (more economic 
integration, mobility, regional conflicts/political dialogue, sectoral reforms and 
so on); Operational issues (action planning processes, review of subcommittee 
structures and remits, fuller involvement of civil society groups, development 
of relations with neighbours outside ENP).
The review documents issued in April 2008 by the Commission presented 
the state of play across the neighbourhood. One of the most important 
bits of news was the development of the New Enhanced Agreement 
(which became the Association Agreement) emerging between the EU 
and Ukraine, the key objectives of which were viewed as deeper economic 
integration (DCFTA) and the setting-up of a new Action Plan.
Twelve months later, the Commission issued its appraisal of the 
implementation of ENP in 2008. In this round of reviews the reporting 
process aimed to link with greater clarity the stated objectives of ENP with 
reference to individual Action Plans and what specific progress had been 
made and / or areas of deficiency. A first point made was that 2008 was a 
difficult year for the ENP:
 Its (2008) last few months were marked by crises that could pose 
long-term challenges for this key EU policy. Two violent conflicts 
broke out: the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 
and the Israeli intervention in Gaza in December 2008/january 
2009. At the turn of the year Eastern partners and the EU suffered 
disruptions of gas supplies as a result of a dispute between Ukraine 
and Russia. Finally, the whole of the ENP area, particularly the 
East, was affected by the deepening global financial and economic 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_774_en.pdf p.2.
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crisis. This unfavourable context underscores the need for even 
more active and tangible EU support for the Neighbourhood to 
promote mutual prosperity, stability and security. 44
Despite a challenging strategic context the Commission saw that ‘partners 
made significant progress on implementation of the ENP in several key areas, 
reflecting the policy’s role as a catalyst for reforms.’ Ukraine’s individual progress 
report pointed to the continuing need to address the country’s problems with 
unity and leadership. Furthermore, the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine, 
put strains on the emerging cooperation between EU member states and 
Ukraine in the energy field in view of transit supplies being temporarily cut. 
Major achievements, according to the report, included:
‘... accession to the World Trade Organisation in May 2008, the 
good progress in negotiations on the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement including those aspects related to a deep and 
comprehensive Free Trade Area, the launch of a visa dialogue 
in October with the aim of establishing a visa free regime as 
a long term perspective and continuing positive cooperation 
with the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM).45
At the same time Ukraine made ‘no or only limited progress in the 
implementation of some key political reform measures including 
constitutional and judicial reform and efforts to combat corruption’.
Moldova’s report on the implementation of ENP in 2008 presents a mixed 
picture.46 Solid progress in some areas, but derisory progress in others. 
The electoral law set up in view of the April 2009 election was viewed 
44 Commission of the European Communities. Commission Staff Working Document 
accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council Implementation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy in 2008. Progress Report Ukraine, Brussels, 23/04/2009.
 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_515_en.pdf p.2.
45 Ibid. p. 2
46 Commission of the European Communities. Commission staff working document 
accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council Implementation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy in 2008. Progress Report Republic of Moldova, Brussels, 23/04/2009.
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as a regression of constitutional and democratic change. And indeed the 
elections of the following year turned out to be a series of debacles, which 
challenged the still nascent state of democracy and stability of the party 
system. Despite this seeming turn for the worse in May 2008, the Moldovan 
executive set up a National Commission for European Integration, chaired 
by the President of the Republic. This point notwithstanding more recent 
reviews on the implementation of ENP show that the EU is still concerned 
with the broader picture of deficiencies in the ENP formula and capacity 
of partners to get to grips with questions relating to good governance, 
ensuring political stability, installation of pro-EU governments, maintaining 
independent judiciaries, carrying out free and fair elections and so on. 
Looking at this ‘macro’ picture and the examples of Ukraine, Moldova and 
of course Belarus there is a dearth of good news and plenty of evidence or 
potential for back-sliding, at this point.47
The most recent round of progress reviews provides an up to date overview 
of the state of play and a useful insight into what might expect from the 
current assessment of the implementation of ENP in the context of the 
Lisbon treaty.48 In this review period, the Commission set itself specific 
tasks to address areas of deficiency. Including the need to encourage 
good governance remains pressing, both as a goal in itself and because it 
ultimately underpins political stability and economic growth. 
What in general terms can be said about the implementation of ENP in the 
three target countries? What ‘state’ are the three neighbours in some five years 
down the line? According to ENP progress reports the policy has had some 
impacts, though results have been patchy, with economic reforms exceeding 
attendant reforms in the area of good governance. Indeed the installation 
of the rule of law, general political stability and eradication of corruption 
at all levels remain crucial ENP areas where progress has been meek. In 
47 Longhurst Kerry (ed.) (2009) Forging a new European Ostpolitik – An Assessment 
of the Eastern Partnership.
48 Commission of the European Communities. Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council Taking Stock of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Brussels, 12/05/2010, COM(2010) 207. 
 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2010/com10_207_en.pdf.
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Ukraine tendencies exist for democratic back-sliding, not to mention Belarus 
where authoritarianism appears to be set in stone. Moldova presents a more 
nuanced picture, but as already noted, the persistence of the Transdnistria 
problem presents a constant drag on the country’s leadership’s attempts at 
modernisation. The EU’s attempts at holding out both stick and carrot vis a 
vis Minsk doesn’t seem to work. To illustrate this argument a number of ENP-
related indicators and themes in the broad area of ‘Good Governance’ and 
instances of change/non-change in the three states can be identified. 
TAbLE 10: CoRRUPTIoN, TRANSPARENCY AND ThE RULE oF LAW
ENP 
STATE
Transparency 
International 
CPI1 Score
CPI Rank  
out of 178
Freedom House
Civil Liberties 
scale of 1-7  
(7 = worst)2
World Governance 
Indicators  
(World Bank) 2009 
(rank 0-100)
Ukraine 2.6 (2005) 
2.2 (2009) 
2.4 (2010) 
99 (2006)
134 (2010)
2 (2005)
2 (2009)
Voice  
and Accountability3 47.4
Rule of Law 26.4
Control of Corruption 20.4
Moldova 2.9 (2005)
3.3 (2009)
2.9 (2010)
79 (2006)
105 (2010)
4 ( 2005)
4 (2009)
Voice  
and Accountability 38.9
Rule of Law 39.2
Control of Corruption 26.2
Belarus 2.1 (2006)
2.5 (2010)
151 (2006)
127 (2010)
6 (2005)
6 (2009)
Voice  
and Accountability 7.1
Rule of Law 18.9
Control of Corruption 23.3
1  Corruption Perceptions Index.  Greece is the lowest scorer of the EU member states at 3.5.
2 Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439. 
3 Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  For all data see Worldwide 
Governance Indicators http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp. 
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Though such indicators may be imperfect and their methodology open 
to criticism, they do relate a palpable lack of change across most sectors 
and across virtually all of the three countries. As was hinted at in ENP 
progress reports corruption remains an entrenched problem and according 
to Transparency International and the World Governance Indicators the 
situation has become markedly worse in Ukraine and Moldova over the 
course of five years. Perceptions of the governments’ ability to tackle 
corruption are also very low, indicating quite meagre public confidence 
in governance and public policy. One might conclude then, that ENP has 
been rather flaccid at tackling this particular problem. 
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TAbLE 11: ThE CoNDUCT oF ELECTIoNS
Ukraine – Presidential Elections January/February 2010
The ‘free and fair’ elections of 2006 were viewed as the democratic breakthrough in 
Ukraine. Four years later observers looked at the Presidential election of January 
2010 for confirmation that democracy had taken firm root. Observers were not 
disappointed in this respect; the OSCE/ODIHR mission report saw that the election 
‘met most OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic 
elections and consolidated progress achieved since 2004’, though it was noted that the 
legal electoral framework needed to be reviewed.27 Some unsubstantiated claims of 
fraud and corruption clouded the atmosphere of the election and impinged on voter 
confidence, it was reported.
Moldova – Parliamentary Elections November 2010
Through much of 2009 and 2010 Moldova was locked in a political stalemate after 
Parliament was repeatedly unable to elect a new President of the Republic. This 
deadlock incited street-violence met with a government clampdown and threatened 
to put into relapse Moldova’s relations with the EU. Early Parliamentary elections were 
subsequently held in late November 2010. In general the conduct of the election was 
lauded by international observers, as meeting ‘most OSCE and Council of Europe 
commitments’. The principle negative point was the need to ‘strengthen public 
confidence in the democratic process’.28
Belarus – Presidential Elections December 2010
There are not many surprises in the case of Belarus. The EU viewed the election of 
December 2010 a failure. The OSCE noted that the actual voting process was good, 
but thereafter the situation deteriorated significantly. The vote counting was judged as 
‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ in almost half of the polling stations, carried out in an intransparent 
manner, with access by observers curtailed. Prior to the election Lukashenko was 
given the lion’s share of airtime for campaigning, coverage of other candidates in the 
media was given mostly in a negative light.29 It was reported that on election day 
some major internet sights were blocked alongside some social networking channels 
and opposition websites. In the course of the day a number of detentions, arrests and 
kidnappings were made.
1  Ukraine Presidential Election 17 january and 7 February 2010.  OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw 28 April 2010.
2 Republic of Moldova Early Parliamentary Elections 28 November. 2010 OSCE/
ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report 26 january 2011. 
3 International Election Observation Republic of Belarus – Presidential Election 
19 December 2010.  OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Statement of 
Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.
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The EU puts a large emphasis upon the conduct of elections in ENP states. 
ENP Action Plans set down expectations for free and fair elections as a 
cornerstone of relations with the EU and a principle benchmark upon 
which deeper cooperation can proceed. The synopsis presented here, 
suggests that in the cases of Ukraine and Moldova elections, at least at 
the national level are proceeding in a mostly ‘free and fair way’. Of course 
in terms of ENP interests and goals it is not just a case of the ‘process and 
conduct’ of counting, but also a case of the outcome of elections and how 
far results deliver pro-EU candidates who are open to EU overtures and 
committed to ENP objectives, a case in point being the end of the Orange 
period in Ukrainian politics. All seems well in the case of Moldova, after 
a few sticky few years, but the result of the 2010 Presidential election in 
Ukraine posed interesting dilemmas for the EU. A democratic election, 
conforming to international standards delivered a President with a less 
than enthusiastic approach to European integration. 
Notwithstanding the conclusions offered above there are some reasons to 
be optimistic. The first EaP progress report from December 2010 served 
as a reminder that negotiations on the Ukrainian AA are proceeding 
satisfactorily. Some key chapters have been closed and others close 
to completion. The AA with Moldova has also proceeded afoot and 
negotiations on a DCFTA are apparently around the corner.
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EU VISA POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE ENP-EAST AREAS – 
Selected Issues
Initiation of discussions between member states and ENP countries on ways •	
to simplify / cheapen Visa acquisition to enter the EU – ‘Visa Dialogues’, ‘Visa 
Facilitation Agreements’ and ‘Visa Liberalisation Action Plans’ (possibly leading 
to Visa-free travel) being the most important tools.
The development of common rules and procedures on the part of the EU for the •	
issuing of Schengen Visas (short-stay) (SVs). To eradicate the variations in national 
procedures and therefore rates in the issuing/refusal of SVs. Leading to the EU Visa 
Code, the Visa Information System (sharing of application/refusal information inter 
alia). Setting up of Common Visa Application Centres in ENP-states for Schengen 
visa applications (modeled on such a Centre piloted in Moldova since 2007).
More fee-waivers; more multiple entry visas to be issued versus single entry.•	
No visa needed for holders of diplomatic passports. for holders of diplomatic •	
passports
READMISSION AGREEMENTS IN THE ENP-EAST AREA
Agreements between ENP countries and EU member states for measures to ensure •	
the proper return of ENP citizens and other third country nationals if their entry 
into the EU is illegal/irregular. Such agreements have proceeded in tandem with 
Visa Facilitation agreements, the latter being offered as a sweetener for Partner’s 
assent to a Readmission Agreement with the EU. 
BORDER MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES IN ENP-EAST
Efforts at coordinating and bringing coherence to the guarding of the EU’s •	
outer borders, through common technologies (including biometric passports), 
methods, curricula for border guard staff etc.
The export of the nascent EU Integrated Border Management model to the ENP •	
countries and states to beyond, as part of the EU’s drive for security (an EaP 
Flagship activity).
Calling for better demarcation and guarding of national borders in the Eastern •	
region, including use of proper national passports (rather than internal CIS travel 
documents). Many borders between former Soviet states are not politically or 
geographically marked. 
Fostering inter-regional cooperation between border guard agencies, using the •	
Soederkoeping framework for this pursuit.
EU efforts at aiding states to improve their general migration management •	
capabilities, asylum laws etc.
EU efforts at reforming national border guard agencies away from •	
paramilitary-style or conscript organisations towards ‘professionalisation’, 
based on EU models.
TAbLE 12:  ASPECTS oF EU mobILITY PoLICY AND ThE EASTERN NEIGhboURS
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Chapter 4. The Area of mobility, Visas and borders
‘Mobility is in itself a key foreign policy priority, as this is the 
prism through which the citizens of partner countries perceive 
the EU.’49
At the start of this paper it was noted how the range of issues caught up in the 
bracket of ‘mobility’ have gained an increasingly more prominent position 
in the ENP-East area. The key question here is about implementation; how 
much progress has been made in this sphere? 
how has the EU Faired?
Both Ukraine and Moldova have had Visa Facilitation and Readmission 
Agreements with the EU in operation since the beginning of 2008. In 
October the same year the European Commission launched a Visa 
Dialogue with Ukraine which focuses on four thematic blocks: document 
security including biometrics, illegal immigration including readmission, 
public order and security, and external relations. A similar dialogue began 
with Moldova in june 2010.
A tangible sign of success in this sphere came in November 2010 when the 
EU offered Ukraine an Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation (VL), signaling 
the start of the ‘operational phase’ of the ongoing Visa Dialogue. A 
comparable offer was made to Moldova in january 2011. The significance 
of such steps is high. To begin, though they do not hold out a clear promise 
or road map to Visa-free travel, it is regarded as a long term goal. This 
commitment from the EU seemingly goes a long way in meeting the 
objectives of Ukraine and Moldova who have both positioned visa-free 
travel into the EU for their citizens as a priority for some time. Moreover, 
many experts argue that visa-free travel, coupled with better short-medium 
49 Communication from the Commission A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy 
Brussels, 05/12/2007 COM(2007) 774 final http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
com07_774_en.pdf. 
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terms offers from EU member states for employment opportunities for 
ENP migrants would help tackle such problems as human trafficking and 
irregular migration by offering a legal alternative for individuals. It is also 
the case that further visa liberalization and facilities to enhance circular 
and seasonal migration into the EU for ENP citizens would help alleviate 
the problems associated with the brain drain from ENP partner states. 
The Action Plans on VL reiterate the main thematic blocks of the overall 
Visa Dialogue, but also bring in new components. A stronger emphasis 
is placed upon actual implementation, which will be vetted by the 
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament – this suggests 
that the celerity at which Ukraine and Moldova will be in a position to get 
a visa-free regime will not be quick.50 Furthermore, the implementation 
of the Action Plan will be accompanied by a study carried out by the 
Commission on the implications of the opening of the EU job market 
for citizens from ENP states. Again, this suggests that the process will be 
fairly drawn out and subject to numerous roadblocks. In the meantime 
one might expect the further development of security and mobility pacts 
between EU member states and ENP partners to slowly develop new paths 
of controlled economic migration. 
Nevertheless the fact that this point has been arrived at is positive evidence 
of a level of success in the implementation of the relevant portions of the 
ENP agenda. In particular it is a recognition of progress in ENP partners’ 
efforts at bringing their policies and institutions up to EU-standards, 
especially in the area of border management, including the reform of 
Border guard agencies, some advances in bio-metrics, document security 
and general improvements in migration management (though national 
ENP progress reviews suggest that much remains to be done here). It is 
also a recognition that the Readmission Agreements are working properly 
50 See Marta jaroszewicz ‘The EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation: an 
Assessment of Ukraine’s Readiness’ http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-
commentary/2011-01-17/eu-ukraine-action-plan-visa-liberalisation-assessment-
ukraine-s. 
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and certainly in the case of Ukraine, the EU’s initiative also takes account 
of the fact that the number of illegal migrants transiting through Ukraine 
on route to the EU has palpably shrunk.51 Thus the extent of the ‘problem’ 
has reduced.
Progress in the Visa Dialogues and full operationalisation of the VL Action 
Plans will depend on further progress in a wide range of fields. All is not 
so rosy. Most crucially, the overall climate of corruption is perhaps the 
biggest and most fundamental hurdle standing in the way of progress and 
full implementation. As noted earlier, systemic corruption and an apparent 
lack of policies to tackle it, conjoined with weak judiciaries does not bode 
well for the fuller and complete adoption of the EU’s requirements in this 
domain. The holding of expelled individuals and their correct treatment 
in line with human rights standards and document security are particular 
areas which might be vulnerable to corruption and mishandling. Fuller 
progress by neighbours and the EU’s will to respond positively will also 
be shaped by reform in the area of migration management, asylum etc. 
This is an area where a report from the European Court of Auditors 
saw that progress in the implementation of projects had been largely 
unsatisfactory.52
It seems to be the case that ENP/EaP provided appropriate hooks upon 
which reforms in all three countries have been carried out in the area of 
the management of borders. A general impression is that the bulk of the 
projects in the jLS concerned the area of Border Management and that 
results have been largely positive in all three countries. A large part of 
this success can be attributed to EUBAM, which provides a focal point 
for reforms, best practice and adoption of EU Acquis and standards in the 
region – beyond the contexts of Ukraine and Moldova. 
51 Ibid.
52 European Court of Auditors’ ‘The Effectiveness of EU Support in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and justice for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine’, Special Report 9, 
2008 http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/2362310.PDF. 
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Though processes remain incomplete, national Border Guard Agencies 
and Services are being reformed away from paramilitary or conscript 
forces, into regular professional agencies in line with EU standards. EU 
assistance helped the phasing out of the conscript system of the Ukrainian 
border guard agency en route towards a full professionalisation. As from 
2008 personnel were recruited through entry examinations and were given 
proper contracts and training, which was not necessarily the case before. 
Moreover, education and training systems were reformed rendering them 
compliant with EU core curriculum for border guard services. EUBAM 
provided support and know-how in the development of risk-based border 
controls, a new border guard law was passed and better functioning of 
cooperation with Ukrainian border authorities and customs emerged. 
A working arrangement between FRONTEX and the Moldovan border 
guard service was signed in Chisinau in August 2008. In addition, a code 
of ethics for border guards was adopted in june 2008, the preparation of 
which was supported by EUBAM expertise. In july 2008, the Government 
adopted a plan on the development of border infrastructure in 2009-2011. 
EU assistance for the development of the border guard service continues 
under the framework of EUBAM. All in all Moldova has become the Bon 
éleve of the ENP states in the broad jLS area and in mobility issues in 
particular.
In the case of Belarus, the most impressive area of activity has been in the 
Border Guard’s adoption of new technologies for border management and 
surveillance, rather than reform of the culture of the organization itself, 
as seems to be the case for Ukraine and Moldova. Vital to note is the fact 
that the military style structure and culture of the Belarusian border guard 
service has aided the efficient implementation of EU-funded projects in 
this area. 
This paper agrees that the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements 
with Ukraine and Moldova seem to be working and that under the new 
Visa Liberalisation Action Plans further progress will be made this year. 
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Strides have also been taken forwards with the development of the EU 
Visa Code, which is seen to be having some positive practical effects, 
such as more fee waivers, shorter queues at national consulates in ENP 
states and degrees of streamlining and transparency in the visa-application 
procedure for ENP citizens. At the same time, the EU Visa Code isn’t yet 
bringing in the level of standardization ultimately aspired too. National 
differences still persist, for example the new EU member states tend to 
issue the most short stay Schengen visas for ENP-East citizens. All in all, 
then, old patterns of visa issuance tend to persist. The intended effects of 
the Code and member states capacities to live up to it will take more time, 
consequently ‘visa shopping’ still occurs. 
The Common Visa Application Centre in Chisinau, which was opened in 
2007 issues Schengen (short-stay) visas for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland and is generally viewed as a success and 
a model to emulate and one which will provide a tangible basis from which 
to properly consolidate the EU Visa Code.53 The rolling out of other such 
centres across the region could have positive effects for both EU states 
and ENP partners.
53 ‘The first EU “Common Visa Application Centre” opens in Moldova’, IP/07/561, 25 
April 2007, available at www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP
/07/561&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
56
Derisory Results or Reasons to be Cheerful?
57
Chapter 5. The Overall Score Sheet  and Recommendations
Chapter 5.  The overall Score Sheet  
and Recommendations
The overall conclusion of this report is that the implementation of ENP 
in the EU’s closest Eastern neighbours has been a patchy affair. One key 
finding is that the condition of democracy in the region is a major factor 
affecting the implementation of ENP in line with objectives set out in 
Action Plans. The persistence of corruption and rather in-transparent legal 
and regulatory systems stymies efficient implementation and monitoring of 
EU-sponsored projects, in both a general sense and in the area of mobility. 
Coupled with this, the lack of an ENP end game arguably undermines 
the effectiveness and reception of ENP in the region. As already noted, 
without strong enough incentives, especially of an economic nature, the 
types of painful and costly reforms that Central European states had to 
go through on route to EU membership may not be warranted as worth 
it in the eyes of elites in ENP partner states. For an example, as discussed 
earlier, the appeal of the DCFTA with the EU for Ukraine may dwindle 
in the face of Russia’s offer of a customs union, which would not require 
far reaching democratic reforms from Kiev. Such an argument also rings 
true in the case of mobility. Though generally speaking it is now easier 
and cheaper for many Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens to acquire visas 
to travel to the EU it is still less complicated and less expensive for them to 
travel to Russia. Crucially, as posited earlier, much of the EU’s credibility in 
the region and overall effectiveness of ENP rests on a better offer from the 
EU for the mobility of ENP citizens through the softening of the Schengen 
border. 
The hope has to be that the new Association Agreements and Association 
Agendas, together with the enhanced offers from EaP will provide better 
hooks upon which ENP governments and societies can align their reform 
agendas. With this point in mind the following key recommendations are 
offered.
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Tackling Corruption
This paper has argued that one of the main obstacles to the better 
implementation of ENP is pervasive corruption, which by all accounts 
persists in all neighbouring states and serves to thwart reform efforts. 
Since good governance and the rule of law are central elements to the ENP 
mission, it stands to reason that the EU should develop more innovative 
ways of helping states to tackle corruption. Of course this is not at all an 
easy task, not least because governments themselves are sources of corrupt 
practices or are strongly susceptible to its effects. ENP governments often 
have no vested interests in tackling corruption. Corrupt practices are often 
viewed in the neighbouring states as just the normal and regular ways 
of doing things, thus any changes to higher standards would require a 
thorough change of culture. The EU needs to be more exacting in spelling 
out what it expects of the neighbours in the area of tackling corruption, 
emphasising small steps rather than preaching about the superiority of EU 
standards. At the same time member states need to be realistic about how 
much change can be expected in the short to medium term. EU efforts 
should concentrate harder on building up national administrations from 
the bottom-up, via the training of young civil servants, for example. 
organising the Neighbourhood
A substantial part of the current debate on ENP concerns the balance 
between the South and the East. Though all eyes are focused on the South 
at present, democratic backsliding in Ukraine and the entrenchment of 
authoritarianism in Belarus shows that there is much unfinished work to 
be done in the East. As already noted the implementation of ENP over the 
past five years or so has issued patchy results all in all. A standard answer 
to this is that greater differentiation should be injected into ENP based 
on a greater division between the Southern and Eastern portions of the 
neighbourhood. However, this paper argues that a profound geographical 
split would serve to severe the EU as a whole from neighbourhood policy 
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and as a consequence EU policy towards the neighbours would become 
parochial and subject to the often very specific preferences of sub-sets of 
member states with their geopolitical interests. In short, the wider strategic 
goals set out in ENP (however imperfect and ill-defined they might 
sometimes be) would be lost. Where ENP needs to remain joined up is on 
tackling the ‘big issues’, namely democratization; installation of the rule of 
law; good governance, tackling corruption and so on. Coherent definitions, 
firm principles backed by funding dedicated to specific priorities within 
this area, which can be monitored and verified over time form a sounds 
basis. Expanding the basis of the Governance Facility could be considered 
in this respect. 
The key recommendation here is based on the idea that little can be gained 
by making such a clear and decisive division on a South/East axis. Instead, 
differentiation should be more graduated; based on concepts of (a) regions 
and (b) on measures of performance.
(a) The UfM and the EaP have already brought strong elements of 
regionalisation to ENP, which, especially in the case of the latter can said 
to be delivering some results. New arrangements within ENP such as 
these and ‘Macro-Region’ initiatives such as the Baltic Sea Strategy or the 
new Danube Strategy can play a complimentary role within and in service 
of the ENP. However, their emphasis and role should not lie in the creation 
of new institutional frameworks or secretariats that might overlap with 
existing structures, but should be project-oriented and fit for function. In 
this way the EaP provides a very useful example with its emphasis upon 
regionally relevant Flagship Initiatives, such as those on energy security 
and border management. The key idea stressed here is that of relevance. 
Infrastructure, transport and environmental projects are the kind of areas 
where regionally focused projects within ENP could find currency in the 
South, where the UfM structure does not seem able to deliver. 
(b) Further on the issue of differentiation is the notion of creating 
mechanisms and opportunities for ENP states to take an accelerated rate 
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of cooperation with the EU if they demonstrate a will and capacity to move 
along the reform track (‘more for more’). The EU’s offer, it seems, has not 
been strong enough to prize Belarus out of its isolationism and neither 
has it been entirely successful at mobilizing a generation of Ukrainian 
elites to stay on a Westwards course. Moldova presents a less negative 
picture, though at the same time Brussels should not take things for 
granted and also needs to think of ways to tackle Transdnistria via using 
the EU’s soft power and economic tools. More responsive mechanisms 
need to be in place to take forwards or pull back on the EU’s offer in 
response to neighbours’ performance. Enhanced mobility options, in 
the direction of more fee waivers, quicker application procedures etc. 
can play a crucial role here. Swifter movement and greater generosity 
in the DCFTAs is also an imperative in this regard.
more Funding for Regional Endeavors?
ENPI funding is overwhelmingly dished out on a country by country 
basis. This national focus mirrors the bilateral Action Plan-based design of 
Neighbourhood Policy and should not be altered fundamentally. However, 
a bolstering of monies dedicated to multilateral/regional endeavors could 
help partner states deliver in such key areas as infrastructure, regional 
transport networks, cross border activities, border management and the 
like – all of which deliver security for both the EU and ENP states, as 
noted above. This idea is based on an assumption that better regional 
networking in amongst the neighbours enhances regional security in the 
neighbourhood and is thus advantageous for the EU too. At the moment 
one of the consequences of the design of ENP/ENPI is that peripheral areas 
of countries, and often border regions, are overlooked. Second, also owing 
to the design of ENP there are many missed opportunities for interregional 
cooperation. Where are the incentives for mutual learning and sharing 
of information between Ukraine and Moldova on the implementation of 
their Action Plans, for example? Such gaps are already being addressed 
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by the new initiatives in EaP and new ‘macro-region’ set-ups, but without 
a re-thinking of how best to allocate funds multilateral endeavours to 
enhance security may well come in under par.
A further comment on this issue relates to the particular case of Belarus. 
Due to its position as an ENP-outlier, if not outlaw, Belarus’ funding is 
small compared to its neighbours and is aimed at socio-economic well-
being and prioritises regional and local authorities. Belarus could gain 
significantly if a bigger proportion of ENPI funds were dedicated to 
regional/multilateral projects, which would boost security and further 
sideline the central government – which is a key objective of EU policy. 
These recommendations notwithstanding, it is the bilateral dimension of 
ENP/EaP which is most important for the Eastern neighbours and has the 
better potential to deliver results. The EaP’s multilateral projects have the 
danger of delivering sub-optimal results since coordination and approval 
is required by all participating EaP states and it can not be guaranteed that 
all states will support all initiatives all the time. Crucially, the appetite for 
multilateral and regionally-based projects is not so high for Ukraine and 
Moldova, which as aspiring members seek to cut their own teeth with 
the EU. The task in hand therefore is to keep and strengthen the bilateral 
channels of ENP/EaP and at the same time think about optimizing a 
regional approach of relevance to the neighbours and to develop it in full 
consultation with them. 
being bolder towards belarus
The EU should be bolder vis a vis Belarus. There has long been talk about 
a ‘shadow’ ENP Action Plan and the time might be right for bringing such 
a plan into the light, to spell out more courageously what the EU can offer 
(and deliver) to ordinary citizens. Of course real change in Belarus will 
only come about once the current regime is either driven out or demises. 
All the EU can do in the meantime is to continue to press on with its 
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policies of sanctions and visa bans vis a vis the government and at the 
same time support forces for democracy and civil society. With a view 
to enhancing the mobility of Belarusian citizens and of giving them a 
positive view of the EU, easier and cheaper visa acquisition, as well as more 
scholarships could be a priority. A change in this respect could prove to be 
an important stimulus to enhance the EU’s mission in this country. 
Softening Schengen: more mobility options
This paper has consistently confirmed that mobility is a fundamental 
feature in ENP-East. It was argued earlier that a commitment from the 
EU in terms of Visa Facilitation/Liberalization has become a key test of the 
EU’s resolve towards the Eastern neighbours. At present the EU’s borders 
remain hard-edged, but at the same time are perforated by the effects of 
visa facilitation agreements and by local border traffic zones (LBTZ), for 
example. This is not a bad start, but clearly there is scope for more far 
reaching efforts in these areas.
(a) Local border Traffic Zones: In time the EU could extend the scope 
of LBTZs. At present such zones cover up to 30kms on either side of a 
border and are strictly implemented. However traffic is very much one-
way. In one of the Polish-Ukrainian LBTZs mobility basically consists 
of local Ukrainian nationals crossing the border once a day selling two 
packets of cigarettes bought in Ukraine and then nipping back home 
having made a small income for a days work. In its current design it 
seems that LBTZs are not meeting their potential. Actively broadening 
the border zone, to say 50kms and providing special privileges for local 
SMEs to do business, as well as incentives for student exchange LBTZs 
could play a security-building role based on socio-economic objectives 
across strategically important border areas. 
(b) EU Visa Policy Developments: These have led to steady positive 
changes in the facilitation of the issuing of Schengen Visas, in terms of 
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easier and swifter delivery of results and easier and cheaper application 
procedures, as noted above. More multiple entry visas are being 
delivered for a basis of six months or more, and queuing times have 
been reduced and become more uniform across consulates, to some 
degree. More fee waivers are being issued, but at the same time more 
people are opting to use external service providers to ensure swifter 
visa delivery, at a cost. Despite this, the perception remains that the EU 
practices a very restrictive Visa policy, which surely impinges upon the 
EU’s notional role as a normative power. Based on this conclusion this 
paper recommends that the EU presses fast forwards with its efforts at 
visa liberalization with Ukraine and Moldova and as noted above, holds 
out the option for Belarusian citizens too. This need not be pursued in a 
grandiose way, but with clearly demarcated steps, such as issuing more 
multiple entry long term visas, establishing more common application 
centres, or at least to think more creatively in this respect, also taking on 
board the need to address the lack of consular services in towns beyond 
national capitals and other major cities. Properly standardizing lists of 
required documents is also a must, since at present particularly on the 
questions of means to return home, the list of documents required is 
rather unspecific or open to interpretation.
(c) EU migration Policy needs to figure more centrally in the development 
of ENP. There are a number of issues relevant here. The first is that EU 
member states need to launch a more rational discussion about their 
immigration needs and to develop a European strategy on migration 
which does not cloak the issue as a security threat. In this way, the 
enlargement of mobility options for ENP citizens could proceed in a 
more constructive and informed way. Of course the ENP menu also 
has to address more squarely the root causes of migration from ENP 
states; people leave a country due to poverty or because of conflict or 
human rights abuses. To address these, the EU needs to enact a fairer 
trade policy, including a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, 
and give more development assistance.
64
Derisory Results or Reasons to be Cheerful?
Annex 1. ENP Timeline 2002-2010
2002 Proposals from British and Swedish Foreign Ministers•	
August: Letter from Patten and Solana•	
2003 May: ‘Wider Europe’ •	 Communication from Commission
July: ‘Paving the Way’ •	 Communication from Commission
July: Wider Europe Task Force established •	
2004 1 May EU enlargement•	
12 May ENP •	 Strategy Paper and Country Reports published30
Southern Caucasus Republics included in the ENP•	
2005 First Action Plans adopted (Ukraine, Moldova, Tunisia, Morocco,  •	
Jordon, Israel, Palestinian Authority) 
2006 Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy •	 Communication  
from the Commission
First set of seven progress reports issued by the Commission•	
Three new Action Plans (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan)•	
2007 December ‘A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy’  •	
Communication from the Commission
ENPI comes into force (replacing TACIS and MEDA)•	
Two new Action Plans (Egypt, Lebanon) •	
2008 Twelve progress reports•	
Union for the Mediterranean established•	
Ukraine and Moldovan Action Plans carried forwards by mutual •	
agreement
2009 Eastern Partnership established•	
Progress reports published•	
2010 Fresh round of progress reports published•	
Call from Catherine Ashton for review of ENP implementation,  •	
consultation process starts in October
2011 Review of the implementation of ENP to be completed in Spring•	
Second EaP summit in October•	
Polish EU Presidency to focus •	 inter alia upon the Eastern Partnership
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